It is a widely held view, and most likely cor­rect, that the cold war was won through an arms race in which — simply put — the Soviet Union just could not sus­tain the drain upon its rel­at­ively lim­ited resources.

The dif­fer­ence today is that Vladi­mir Putin only has Rus­sia and not all of the old Soviet ter­rit­or­ies to rein in. While this fur­ther lim­its his resources, it is easier for him to polit­ic­ally man­age a smal­ler domestic audi­ence, espe­cially one that has little or no his­tory of demo­cratic val­ues and in which civil soci­ety has been largely rendered a zom­bie. The state of a civil soci­ety is indeed the best cri­terion by which to clas­sify dif­fer­ent states. The ques­tion is how much longer Rus­sian civil soci­ety can with­stand declin­ing liv­ing stand­ards and col­lapsing infra­struc­ture, as sug­ges­ted by Mar­tin Sandbu (Opin­ion, Feb­ru­ary 12).

Army recruit­ment offers wages to many, but shops are not full of goods to be bought. In this sense it is a race against time for Putin, and there­fore for Ukraine, and by implic­a­tion for the rest of Europe, and without Europe as its outer line of defence, for the US as well. This is not the time to shy away from a res­ol­ute defence of Ukraine’s inde­pend­ence. To do so will come at a much greater cost down the road.

Pro­fessor John Ure
Singa­pore

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